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ARTICLE
On the person and oﬃce of the sovereign in Hobbes’
Leviathan
Laurens van Apeldoorn
Faculty of Governance and Global Aﬀairs, Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
I contextualize and interpret the distinction in Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) between
the capacities of the sovereign and show its importance for contemporary
debates on the nature of Hobbesian sovereignty. Hobbes distinguishes between
actions the sovereign does on personal title (as a natural person), and actions he
undertakes in a political capacity (as artiﬁcial person and in the oﬃce of
representative of the state). I argue that, like royalists defending King Charles I
before and during the English civil war, he maintains that the highest magistrate
is sovereign in both his natural and political capacities because the capacities are
inseparable, though district. This position goes back to the treatment of Calvin’s
Case by Francis Bacon and Edward Coke and has further precedents in medieval
English constitutional thought. An important reason for Hobbes to include this
doctrine in Leviathan, I suggest, is to provide a response to parliamentarians who
employed the sovereign’s multiple capacities to justify armed resistance against
the king. I show the relevance of this contextualization by intervening in two
recent debates, regarding the possibility of constitutionalist limitations on the
actions of the Hobbesian sovereign and regarding whether sovereignty is held
by the commonwealth or by the person of the sovereign.
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1.
An important, but often overlooked innovation in Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651), is
the distinction between actions the sovereign does on personal title (as a
natural person), and actions he undertakes in a ‘Politicall’ or ‘Publique’ capacity
(as artiﬁcial person and in the oﬃce of representative of the state).1 In The
Elements of Law (1640) and De Cive (1642, 2nd ed. 1647) Hobbes had main-
tained that the sovereign is a natural person (or an assembly of natural
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persons). The sovereign is he to whom citizens have alienated their right to all
things and who consequently wields preeminent power in society (EL 1.19.10,
p. 104; DCv 5.11, pp. 73–4). In Leviathan, prospective citizens institute a com-
monwealth, not only by alienating their right to govern themselves, but also
by authorizing a man or assembly to represent them in all his or their judge-
ments and actions. The authorized representation establishes the common-
wealth and the sovereign as occupying the oﬃce of representative of that
corporate body. The sovereign therefore
representeth two Persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two
Capacities, one Naturall, and another Politique (as a Monarch, hath the person
not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly
hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly).
(L 23.2, p. 376; also, L 19.4, p. 288; L 24.8, p. 392)2
Insofar as the sovereign acts in his political capacity he represents the entire
commonwealth; when acting in his natural capacity he represents only
himself (and he is not, properly speaking, sovereign at all).3
In this paper, I contextualize the distinction and show its relevance for con-
temporary debates on the nature of Hobbesian sovereignty. A closer study of
Hobbes’ position reveals that, like royalists defending King Charles I before
and during the English civil war, he maintains that the highest magistrate is
sovereign in both his natural and political capacity because the capacities
are inseparable, though district. This is a position with clear precedents in
medieval and early modern English constitutional thought. An important
reason for Hobbes to include this doctrine in Leviathan, I will suggest, is to
provide a response to parliamentarians who employed the sovereign’s mul-
tiple capacities to justify armed resistance against the king. They maintained
that Charles had committed a breach of trust, thereby forfeited his political
oﬃce, and, as natural person, could lawfully be resisted. In Leviathan
Hobbes accepts the distinction that made this argument possible only to
subvert it and bolster his account of absolute sovereignty in which no
breach of trust by the sovereign can ever be suﬃcient to justify rebellion.4
I bring this conclusion to bear on two recent debates in the literature. The
ﬁrst concerns the extent to which Hobbes is committed to constitutionalist
2Abizadeh, ‘Sovereign Jurisdiction’ (409, fn. 50), observes that the claim that the sovereign represents two
persons is not meant to be exhaustive since the sovereign certainly also represents God, and most prob-
ably, also the citizens individually.
3See Hobbes’ deﬁnition of sovereignty: ‘he that carryeth this Person [the commonwealth] is called SOVER-
AIGNE’ (L 17.14, p. 262). In what follows I use the terms ‘sovereign’ and ‘supreme magistrate’ to refer to
both the natural and political person of the sovereign.
4The parliamentarian pamphleteers only developed these lines of argument after Hobbes had already
published De Cive in 1642. Quentin Skinner has shown that Leviathan reveals extensive engagement
with parliamentarians and that Hobbes at many turns ‘is seeking to discredit them by demonstrating
that it is possible to accept the basic structure of their theory without in the least endorsing any of
the radical implications they had drawn from it’ (Skinner, ‘Hobbes on Representation’, 168–9).
Hobbes’ treatment of the sovereign’s multiple capacities is a further example of that strategy.
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limitations on the actions of the sovereign. Several interpreters, including
David Dyzenhaus, have suggested that Hobbes came to accept that the sover-
eign’s capacity to occupy public oﬃce is conditional on his compliance with
principles of legality and natural law, principles that form ‘fundamental
norms of the moral community of which all legal subjects are members and
that make it possible for the artiﬁcial person of the sovereign to have and
to exercise authority’ (Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes on the Authority of Law’, 208). If
the sovereign violates these norms he no longer acts in his capacity as repre-
sentative of the state. I will argue that this interpretation is in tension with
Hobbes’ response to the parliamentarians: like the supporters of Charles I,
Hobbes wished to distinguish between the capacities of the sovereign pre-
cisely to show they are inseparable.
The second debate involves the question who, in Leviathan, holds sover-
eignty. Quentin Skinner has in several inﬂuential articles argued that Leviathan
is epoch-making since, for the ﬁrst time, sovereignty is attributed to the imper-
sonal state or commonwealth, with the person of the sovereign acting merely
as the state’s temporary representative.5 In response, a number of critics have
reiterated the traditional view that not the commonwealth but the natural
person of the sovereign – the monarch or sovereign assembly – holds sover-
eignty. I argue that, since the two capacities of the sovereign are inseparable,
the sovereign holds sovereignty in both his personal and political capacity,
and accordingly, that both Skinner and his critics give an incomplete account
of the location of sovereignty in the Hobbesian state.
2.
Hobbes’ frank admission in Leviathan that the sovereign has multiple capacities
appears quite astonishing if one considers that this claim was central to parlia-
mentarian justiﬁcations of resistance against Charles I.6 As the royalist cleric Peter
Heylyn recalls in his Aerius Redivivus, or, the History of the Presbyterians (1670),
parliamentarians drew on several familiar arguments by George Buchanan,
John Knox and other protestant resistance theorists to limit the monarch’s legit-
imate powers. However, the contention ‘which served their turn best’was ‘a new
distinction which they had coined between the Personal and Political capacity of
the Supreme Magistrate’. It allowed them to make war on the king in his per-
sonal capacity while claiming allegiance to him in his political capacity, and so
‘destroy CHARLES STVART, without hurting the King’.7
5Skinner, ‘Hobbes and the Purely Artiﬁcial Person of the State’; Skinner, ‘Hobbes on Representation’;
Skinner, ‘A Genealogy of the Modern State’. Also, Lee, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional
Thought; Nelson, The Making of the Modern State (esp. 67–9).
6Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution (204), calls the doctrine of the king’s two bodies
‘indispensable to the rebel cause’.
7Heylyn, Aerius Redivivus (447); Heylyn, The Rebells Catechism (20).
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3
This inﬂammatory case for the legality of armed resistance depended on
two further arguments. First, following the author of Vindiciae contra tyrannos
(1579), parliamentarians such as Henry Parker and William Prynne maintained
that the king occupied the royal oﬃce only conditionally, by a grant from the
people that imposed duties on the oﬃce holder; the king was able to act in a
political capacity only by virtue of a ‘donation of the people’ that was ‘in part
conditionate and ﬁduciary’ (Parker, Observations Upon Some of His Majesties
Late Answers, 4). This implied that if the highest magistrate should breach
the trust placed in him by attempting to deprive the people ‘of their Lives,
Goods, Liberties, Religion, Lawes or make open warres upon them’, he
could rightfully be resisted by ‘defensive Armes’ (Prynne, The Soveraigne
Powers of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 91). The second argument established
Parliament in these circumstances as temporarily acting on behalf of the
king’s political oﬃce. England was, as the pamphleteer Charles Herle had it,
a ‘coordinative’ or mixed monarchy in which the Houses of Parliament and
the King had a joint right to govern. In cases of imminent danger, however,
Parliament could act without the participation of the King who would then
nevertheless be present ‘virtually’ or ‘in law’.8 After establishing that Charles
had become a threat to the safety of the people, and that, in the words of
the protestant minister Samuel Rutherford, ‘the Parliaments are as Legall, as
if he [the king] were personally present with them’, they could justify, in
name of the king, the overthrow of Charles who now acted on behalf of
no-one but himself (Rutherford, Lex, Rex the Law and the Prince, 271).
The two Houses of Parliament put their case plainly following the confron-
tation at the city of Hull, just months before the start of the war. Responding to
Charles’ accusation that Sir John Hotham had committed treason by forcefully
preventing the king’s entrance to the city, they claimed that Hotham had
faithfully acted ‘in Obedience to his majesty and his authority’ as expressed
in instructions from Parliament. To violently resist the king’s law and authority
would indeed be treasonous, but ‘the levying of force against his personal
commands, though accompanied with his presence; and not against this
law and authority, but in the maintenance thereof, is no levying of war
against the king, but for him’.9
In Behemoth (1668, publ. 1681), his history of the civil war, Hobbes shows
himself familiar with, and exceedingly critical of these attempts to drive a
wedge between the king’s personal and political capacities. Summarizing Par-
liament’s response to Charles, he writes that
8Herle, A Fuller Answer (3–8); Marsh, An Argument or, Debate in Law (7, 16, 36); the declaration of the Par-
liament in response to the King’s proclamation of 27 May 1642, in Cobbett, Cobbett’s Parliamentary
History (vol. 2, cols. 1355–7). For a discussion of these arguments, see Weston and Greenberg, Subjects
and Sovereigns (ch. 3).
9‘Remonstrance of both Houses, in Answer to the King’s Declaration concerning Hull, May 26’, in Cobbett,
Cobbett’s Parliamentary History (vol. 2, col. 1310).
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the leuying of forces against the personall Commands of the King (though
accompanied with his presence) is not leuying Warre against the King; but the
levying of Warre against his Politick person, viz. his Laws etc. though not
accompanied with his person, is levying Warre against the King,
and accordingly that ‘Treason cannot be committed against his person,
otherwise then as he is intrusted with the Kingdome, and discharges that
trust’ (B p. 244). This summary is copied almost verbatim from His Majesties
Answer to a Printed Book, written for the king by Edward Hyde, with that
difference that Hyde followed the Parliament in referring to the king’s
‘Law and Authority’ while Hobbes speaks of the king’s ‘Politick person’.10
Hobbes scornfully denies that one could distinguish in this manner
between the king’s ‘person Naturall and Politick’, or that the king could be
‘vertually’ in the two Houses of Parliament. These arguments, Hobbes
asserts, were ‘but an Vniversity quibble, such as boys make vse of, in main-
taining (in the Schooles) such tenents as they cannot otherwise defend’ (B
pp. 273, 297).11
Why, then, does Hobbes admit in Leviathan that the sovereign has multiple
capacities? I wish to suggest that he was committed to what had until then
been the prevailing treatment of the position of the monarch in the English
constitution. This view, which in the turmoil of the civil war became associated
with the supporters of Charles I, admitted that the monarch has distinct
bodies or capacities, but stressed that they are inseparable. It received its
canonical expression by Sir Francis Bacon in a set of speeches given as Solici-
tor General in Calvin’s Case (also known as the Case of the Postnati) and by Sir
Edward Coke in his subsequent account of the case in the seventh part of his
Reports.12 The case considered whether so-called postnati, individuals born in
Scotland after the accession of James VI of Scotland to the throne of England
in 1603, were entitled to the privileges of English citizenship. In English law
the monarch was long considered to have two bodies or capacities.13
Besides being a natural person, the king also has a corporate body or political
capacity, ‘framed by the policy of man’ as Coke put it, and constituted by the
law of the land (Coke, ‘Calvin’s Case’, 189). Those wishing to deny English citi-
zenship to the postnati argued that allegiance and citizenship were in relation
to the king’s political capacity (Howell, Cobbett’s Complete Collection, vol. 2, col.
567). Drawing on the civil law maxim ‘quando duo jura concurrunt in una
10Compare [Hyde], His Majesties Answer, to a Printed Book (31).
11Hobbes’ response is discussed in Brito Vieira, The Elements of Representation in Hobbes (126–7).
12The seventh volume of Coke’s Reports was available to Hobbes in the Hardwick library. See Talaska, The
Hardwick Library (78). Hobbes, who had been Bacon’s amanuensis, would have been familiar with
Bacon’s general account of the case in ‘A brief discourse touching the happy union of the kingdoms
of England and Scotland’ and ‘Certain articles or considerations touching the union of England and Scot-
land’ which were included in Hardwick M.51, a collection of sixteen transcriptions of Bacon’s works. See
Bunce, ‘Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes’ (25–6); Aubrey, ‘Brief Lives’ (vol. 1, 331).
13Plowden, The Commentaries (212a). The classic study of this idea is Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies.
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persona, aequum est ac si essent in diversis’ – when two rights or oﬃces are
united in one person they are held as if by two distinct persons – they con-
cluded the postnati owe allegiance to the king in his capacity of King of Scot-
land, and therefore remain English aliens (Howell, Cobbett’s Complete
Collection, vol. 2, col. 565). In response Bacon and Coke argued that, since
one’s allegiance to the monarch is prior to positive law, citizenship depends
on one’s allegiance to the king in his natural capacity, making one a citizen
of all kingdoms he governs in his political capacities.14 Hence, they rejected
the applicability of ‘the Rule cum duo Iura’ (Bacon, Three Speeches, 25).
Bacon admitted the rule as principle, ‘not of the Civill Law onely, but of
common reason’, but denied it applied in the speciﬁc case of the Crown
(Bacon, Three Speeches, 24). The Crown is unlike any other corporation,
since, as the sixteenth-century common lawyer Edmund Plowden had docu-
mented, there is a reciprocal communication of qualities between the king’s
natural and political capacities. For instance, it is treasonous to seek the
death of the king’s spouse although corporations cannot marry, and the
Crown goes by descent, ‘which is a thing strange, and contrary to the
course of all Corporations’.15 Analogously, the postnati must be considered
English citizens since their alliance, due to the king in his natural capacity, is
communicated to his political capacities: the ‘subjection to the Kings
person, and to the Crown, are inseparable, though distinct’ (Bacon, Three
Speeches, 44). Indeed, to admit that the capacities of the monarch are separ-
able could give rise, in the words of Coke, to the ‘damnable and damned
opinion’ that allegiance was due ‘more by reason of the King’s Crown (that
is, of his politic capacity) than by reason of the person of the King’, warranting
treasonous rebellion against the king’s person in name of the oﬃce he
occupies.16
Unsurprisingly, Coke and Bacon’s treatment of the status of postnati was
taken up by defenders of Charles I. In Salmasius His Buckler, or, a Royal
Apology for King Charles the Martyr, a pseudonymous Restoration tract,
Calvin’s Case was praised as the ‘weightiest case that ever was argued in
any Court’, since it indisputably demonstrated that obedience had been
due ‘to the natural body… of King Charles’ during the civil war.17 The royalist
judge David Jenkins, who was imprisoned for much of the civil war and the
Interregnum, emphasized in several of his writings that ‘[t]o aﬃrme that the
Kings power … is separable from his person, is high Treason by the Law of
the Land; which is so declared by that learned man of the law, Sir Edward
14Bacon, Three Speeches (8–9); Coke, ‘Calvin’s Case’ (190–2).
15Bacon, Three Speeches (41). See also Plowden, The Commentaries (242–242a); Kantorowich, The King’s
Two Bodies (9).
16Coke, ‘Calvin’s Case’ (192); Bacon, Three Speeches (43); Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, (364–72).
17Bonde, Salmasius His Buckler (229, 233). MacLean, The Return of the King, identiﬁes the author as the
lawyer and poet Giles Duncombe.
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Cooke’.18 Even Charles I availed himself of the argument shortly before the
start of the war. After noting that some of his subjects ‘have gone about sub-
tilly to distinguish betwixt Our Person and Our Authority’, he drew on Calvin’s
Case to demonstrate that ‘their Allegiance is due unto the naturall Person of
their Prince, and not to His Crown or Kingdome distinct from His naturall
Capacitie’.19
3.
The royalist response to the notion that the king’s capacities may be severed, I
wish to suggest, is also Hobbes’. In Leviathan, Hobbes is committed to the
view, originally defended by Coke and Bacon, that the king’s capacities are
distinct, yet indivisible. Since there is a communication of juridical incidents
between the two capacities, allegiance to the sovereign is as much due to
him as natural person as it is to him in his capacity as representative of the
commonwealth.
Defending this reading of Leviathan requires rejecting a natural account of
Hobbes’ doctrine of authorized representation, according to which he is com-
mitted to the cum duo Iura rule. This account is implied in Michael Green’s
recent argument for the claim that Hobbes’ use of the authorization doctrine
in Leviathan is ‘to establish mere ownership of an action’ (Green, ‘Authorization
and Political Authority’, 29). Hobbes maintains that ‘when the Actor [the repre-
sentative] maketh a Covenant by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author [the
represented], no lesse than if he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth
him to all the consequences of the same’ (L 16.5, p. 246; also L 16.7, p. 246; L 16.8,
p. 246). By authorizing an action, Green concludes, we make it ours for ‘moral
and legal purposes’.20 It is as if the represented, not the representative, acts.
Hence, while the representative bears or represents two persons (his own and
that of the represented) it is as if these persons are borne by distinct individuals.
Green develops his interpretation of the authorization doctrine in response
to commentators who have thought that Hobbesian authorization involves
extending rights.21 To extend a right is to allow another person to act on
one’s right. Hobbes maintains that in the original agreement prospective citi-
zens both authorize, and alienate the right of governing themselves to, the
prospective sovereign (L 17.13, p. 260). A contradictory account of the original
18Jenkins, The Vindication of Judge Jenkins (5). In Jenkins, Lex Terrae (10), he cited Calvin’s Case for the claim
that the monarch’s ‘body naturall and politique make one body, and are not to be severed: Ligeance is
due to the naturall body, and is due by nature’.
19‘A Proclamation forbidding all Levies of Forces without His Majesties expresse pleasure’, in [Husbands],
An Exact Collection (370).
20Green, ‘Authorization and the Right to Punish’ (118); Green, ‘Authorization and Political Authority’
(29–30).
21Among others, Martinich, Hobbes (115–25); Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance (93); Lloyd, Morality in the
Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (284). See Green, ‘Authorization and Representation’ (30).
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agreement looms if prospective citizens both extend rights to the sovereign
(by authorizing him), while they simultaneously alienate those very rights.22
Conceiving of authorization instead as establishing ownership of an action
resolves the contradiction. It can account for cases where the action, while
authorized, is unlawful or without right. As Green notes, ‘I can bear responsi-
bility for actions that I own even though I lack the right to do them. This
happens when one party authorizes another to violate the law’ (Green, ‘Auth-
orization and Political Authority’, 30). When I authorize someone to act in vio-
lation of the law and my representative acts on that authorization, a wrong
has been committed for which I bear responsibility.
This solution is not fully satisfactory, however. What must be explained is
not only that I can own, and bear responsibility for, actions that are unlawful
because I lack the right to do them, but also that I can own, and bear respon-
sibility for, actions that are lawful even though I lack the right to do them. In the
Hobbesian commonwealth, citizens own all actions of the sovereign, includ-
ing those they themselves lack the right to do – such as, to take an
extreme example, arbitrarily seizing citizens’ property – actions that are never-
theless lawful or done with right. The sovereign may rightfully seize property
and he may do so in my name. This is possible because, like Coke and Bacon,
Hobbes rejects the cum duo Iura rule in the case of sovereignty. There is a
communication of juridical incidents between the distinct capacities of the
sovereign. I own the actions of the sovereign done in his capacity as my repre-
sentative, yet in that capacity he may act on rights acquired and held in his
personal capacity. I can therefore bear responsibility for actions I lack the
right to do, which are nevertheless lawfully done in my name because my
representative has the right to do them.
4.
Hobbes’ rejection of the cum duo Iura rule is evinced by the fact that the
supreme magistrate, in his political capacity, exercises rights acquired and
held in his personal capacity. The rights in question are the ‘essential Rights
of sovereignty’, including the rights to judge what opinions are ﬁt to be
taught publicly, to legislate, to adjudicate legal controversies, and to punish
oﬀenders (L 18.10, p. 274; also L 18.9, p. 272; L 18.11, p. 274).23
That the supreme magistrate acquires and holds the rights of sovereignty
in his personal capacity follows both from his account of the original covenant
22Martinich, Hobbes (118); Martinich, ‘Authorization and Representation’ (316–18).
23Hobbes is disappointingly vague about the nature of the right to legislate. Since it is ‘derived’ from the
‘Institution of the Common-wealth’ (L 18.10, p. 274; also L 18.2 p. 264), and concerns ‘the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he
may doe’ (L 18.10, p. 274), I posit that the right, like other rights of sovereignty, is (partly) correlative to
the obligations citizens have by virtue of having given up the right to govern themselves (L 17.13,
p. 260).
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and his conception of treason. In the original covenant outlined in Leviathan
prospective citizens agree to alienate the rights of sovereignty, characterized
there as the ‘right to govern themselves’, to the ‘Man, or Assembly’ bearing
the person of the commonwealth (the sovereign’s natural person), not the
commonwealth itself (the sovereign’s political person).24 Nor could it have
been otherwise. An alienation of rights to the sovereign’s political person
would be in vain. In his political capacity the sovereign represents, besides
the commonwealth, also each of the citizens individually; indeed, Hobbes
appears to treat these two forms of representation as equivalent (L 23.2,
p. 376; L 16.13, p. 248). This is, for instance, why a citizen cannot accuse the
sovereign of a breach of covenant: any such breach is ‘the act both of
himself, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of
every one of them in particular’ (L 18.4, p. 266).25 Insofar as the sovereign is
their authorized representative, the juridical eﬀects of his actions or agree-
ments fall on the citizens as represented, not on the sovereign as representa-
tive (L 16.5, p. 246). The implication is that if prospective citizens were to
alienate a right to the sovereign in his political capacity, they would alienate
that right (also) to themselves. The alienation would therefore lack the requi-
site eﬀect of binding them to submission to the rule of another. Accordingly,
Hobbes presents the commonwealth (the sovereign’s political person) as tem-
porally posterior to the covenant within which citizens alienate their right to
govern themselves. ‘This done’, Hobbes writes after reciting the covenant
establishing sovereign, ‘the Multitude so united… is called a COMMON-
WEALTH’ (L 17.13, p. 260). Since the commonwealth only exists after the orig-
inal covenant has taken place, the commonwealth cannot have been the
beneﬁciary of a conferral of rights. The rights of sovereignty must have
been acquired by the sovereign on personal title.26
From Hobbes’ treatment of treason it follows that the supreme magistrate
not only holds the rights of sovereignty in his personal capacity but also can
demand allegiance from his subjects in that capacity. (This is to be expected
since allegiance is due by virtue of having alienated the right to govern
oneself.) Treason is a violation of the natural law requiring one to perform
one’s covenants (L 15.1, p. 220). By denying the authority of the sovereign trai-
tors break the original agreement that established the commonwealth, which
is a ‘transgression of natural, not civil, law’ (DCv 14.21, p. 166; L 28.13, p. 486).
The reason, Hobbes explains in De Cive, is that
the obligation to civil obedience, by force of which all civil laws are valid, is prior
to every civil law … If a sovereign prince made a civil law in the form: do not
24L 17.13 (p. 260). See also Green, ‘Authorization and Political Authority’ (33).
25As Green, ‘Authorization and Political Authority’ (35), argues, the phrase ‘by the Right’ must be read as
‘by the authority’.
26See also Martinich, ‘Authorization and Representation’ (332).
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rebel!, he would achieve nothing. For unless the citizens are previously obligated
to obedience … every law is invalid; and an obligation which binds one to do
something which one is already obligated to do is superﬂuous.
(DCv 14.21, p. 166; also L 30.4, p. 522)
As treason is the violation of the contract that establishes the commonwealth,
the ‘obligation to civil obedience’ due to the sovereign must be due in his
natural capacity; it is an obligation acquired before the establishment the
commonwealth and the sovereign’s political capacity. Hobbes’ account of
treason closely resembles that of both Coke and Bacon in Calvin’s Case.
Both Coke and Bacon present the possibility of treasonous acts in the
absence of positive law (for instance, in kingdoms ‘governed by naturall
equity’) as evidence that allegiance to kings is by natural law and therefore
due to them in their personal capacity (Bacon, Three Speeches, 38; Coke,
‘Calvin’s Case’, 190–1). Coke notes that it would have been
vain to have prescribed Laws to any, but to such as owed Obedience, Faith, and
Ligeance before, in respect whereof they were bound to obey and observe
them: Frustra enim feruntur leges nisi subditis et obedientibus [It is in vain to
make laws unless there are subjects and persons who will obey them].
(Coke, ‘Calvin’s Case’, 197)
While positive law may subsequently make the citizens’ obligation of obedi-
ence ‘more formall’ (Bacon, Three Speeches, 5, 9), this obligation is prior to posi-
tive law. Acts of treason are therefore always (also) a breach of the law of
nature (Coke, ‘Calvin’s Case’, 190). Since the king’s political capacity is consti-
tuted by positive law and allegiance to the king is due by natural law, Coke
and Bacon conclude, allegiance must be due to the king in his natural
capacity.27
While sovereigns in their personal capacity acquire the rights of sover-
eignty (and can demand allegiance from citizens), they exercise these rights
in their political capacity and as representatives of the commonwealth.
They do so necessarily because sovereigns cannot act without authority
from their subjects: prospective citizens ‘Authorise all the Actions and Judge-
ments of that Man, or Assembly of men’, so that they are the ‘Author of all his
Soveraign shall do’ (L 18.1, p. 264; also L 17.13, p. 260; L 20.1, p. 306; L 21.10,
p. 336; L 21.14, p. 338; L 22.9, p. 352, L 24.6, p. 390; L 18.3, p. 266; L 18.7, p. 270;
L 20.13, p. 314). Hobbes’ treatment of several speciﬁc government functions
shows this more plainly. Take legislation. The sovereign cannot, in his personal
capacity, enact laws. Legislation, on Hobbes’ understanding, is a public act
with the law expressing the will of the commonwealth. Laws are not private
commands but ‘Rules Authorised’ (L 30.21, p. 540). Accordingly Hobbes
27Coke, ‘Calvin’s Case’ (197). In a signiﬁcant departure from Coke, Bacon maintains that this is only the case
in monarchies since commonwealths ruled by assemblies are necessarily constituted by positive laws
such that allegiance may be due by positive, not natural, law (Bacon, Three Speeches, 4–5).
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attributes to the commonwealth the authority to legislate, speaks of the sub-
ject’s obligation to obey ‘the commands of the Common-wealth’, and main-
tains that ‘[a]ll breaches of the Law, are oﬀences against the Common-
wealth’ (L 26.2, p. 414; L 26.4, p. 416; L 33.24, p. 604; L 30.15, p. 534; L 29.6,
p. 502; L 30.14, p. 532). It is true that he also sometimes speaks of the legisla-
tive capacity as ‘residing in the Soveraign’ (L 33.24, p. 604). However, he
clariﬁes that this is consistent with attributing the capacity to the common-
wealth because ‘the Common-wealth is no Person, nor has capacity to doe
any thing, but by the Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore
the Soveraign is the sole Legislator’ (L 26.5, p. 416).
Hobbes’ treatment of punishment forms a second example. He deﬁnes
punishment in part as ‘an Evill inﬂicted by publique Authority’ (L 28.1, p. 482).
The sovereign can punish citizens only insofar as he represents the common-
wealth. This is why a citizen is always the ‘author of his own punishment’ (L
18.3, p. 266). Conversely, harm inﬂicted by the sovereign in his purely personal
capacity would not count as an instance of punishment but would rather con-
stitute an ‘act of hostility’: the ‘injuries of private men’ cannot ‘properly be
stiled Punishment’ since they ‘have not for Author, the person condemned;
and therefore are not acts of publique Authority’ (L 28.6, p. 484; also L 28.3,
p. 484). Nevertheless, the right by which the sovereign punishes is a right
he holds on personal title.28 Unlike other rights of sovereignty the ‘Right
which the Common-wealth (that is, he or they that represent it) hath to
Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects’. Rather,
the ‘foundation of that right of Punishing’ is the sovereign’s natural right to
‘do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation’, which, since
it dates from before the establishment of the commonwealth, must be held
by the sovereign in his personal capacity (L 28.2, p. 482).
The conclusion in these cases must be that Hobbes rejects the cum duo Iura
rule and that there is a communication of juridical incidents between the dis-
tinct capacities of the sovereign. In this respect Hobbes follows medieval
treatments of the mystical union between the king’s two bodies that
formed the basis of the ruling in Calvin’s Case. As one of the judges notes
in Willion v Berkley (1561) – a case cited by both Coke and Bacon – ‘the
King has two Capacities’ and accordingly can acquire property either in his
natural or his politic capacity (Plowden, The Commentaries, 242). Yet, as the
judge continues, these capacities or bodies are indivisible, ‘not distinct, but
united, and as one Body’. Property owned by the king in his natural capacity
therefore receives the gloss of the royal oﬃce:
28Ristroph, ‘Respect and Resistance’ (615, fn. 65), who assumes that Hobbes accepts the cum duo Iura rule,
argues that sovereigns must hold the natural right to punish in their political capacity, but admits this is
‘perplexing’ since ‘it is not clear why sovereigns [in their political capacity] – who are not obviously
mortal beings – would have a similar right [to self-preservation]’.
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the Land which he takes in the Capacity of his Body natural he has not merely as
a Common Person, but as a natural Man and as a King also, and as to such Land
he shall have the Prerogatives of King, because the royal Estate is conjoined to
the Person who holds the same.
(Plowden, The Commentaries, 242–242a)
Hence, property privately acquired by the king cannot be sold except by
letters-patent, and if it is granted to a subject in fee it is held ‘in capite by
Knight’s Service’ (Plowden, The Commentaries, 242a). The king’s political
capacity subsumes his personal capacity in matters of the law. So too, for
Hobbes’ sovereign.
One may question whether the legal ﬁction of a union between the king’s
two bodies is consistent with Hobbes’ view that sovereignty may be held,
not only by a monarch with a ‘Body natural’, but also by an assembly with
a body that is constituted by artiﬁcial bonds. Hobbes certainly answers
this question in the aﬃrmative. He plainly admits that, like monarchs, sover-
eign assemblies bear a natural and a political person (a sovereign ‘has two
Capacities, one Naturall, and another Politique… [as] a Soveraign Assembly
hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly’)
(L 23.2, p. 376). This counter-intuitive claim follows from his deﬁnition of a
natural person as someone (or something) representing itself (L 16.1–2,
p. 244). To the extent that a sovereign assembly acts in its own name
(rather than in name of the commonwealth) it acts as a natural person
and in a personal capacity. Additionally, while Hobbes does not explain
how assemblies are formed, he does assume that their formation has
been completed before they are granted sovereignty: in the original cove-
nant establishing a sovereign assembly, individuals authorize, and alienate
their right to govern themselves to ‘this Assembly of men’.29 Accordingly,
whatever are the bonds holding together the body of the assembly, they
are not the bonds of positive law (since there is no positive law prior to
the establishment of the sovereign).30 Hobbes can therefore treat the mul-
tiple capacities of sovereign assemblies as fully analogous to the multiple
capacities of monarchs. The rights of the natural person of the sovereign
(whether a monarch or sovereign assembly) are also attributable to the artiﬁ-
cial person of the commonwealth, apparently because the same man or
assembly represents both persons. Conversely, subjects owe allegiance to
the monarch or sovereign assembly both as a natural person and as repre-
sentative of commonwealth. The capacities of the supreme magistrate are,
as Bacon put it, ‘inseparable, though distinct’.
29L 17.13 (p. 260, my italics). For a diﬀerent argument for the same conclusion, see Martinich, ‘Authoriz-
ation and Representation’ (334).
30Hobbes follows Coke in this regard, see fn. 27.
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5.
Several recent commentators, including most notably David Dyzenhaus, have
sought to present a constitutionalist reading of Hobbes, according to which
the supreme magistrate’s capacities are separable.31 According to Dyzenhaus,
the sovereign only acts in his public capacity and as representative of the
commonwealth as far as his acts conform to certain fundamental, publicly
identiﬁable laws: the sovereign ‘is an artiﬁcial person, who acts as a sovereign
only as long as he acts within the constraints of his role’ (Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes’s
Constitutional Theory’, 461). These constraints include a legal rule of recog-
nition, which, if violated would render acts of sovereignty unrecognizable
as acts of sovereignty, and, the laws of nature, which, if violated would
make the acts of sovereignty unintelligible for subordinate oﬃcers who
have a duty to interpret positive law as intended to be consistent with
natural law.32 Dyzenhaus calls the former constraint the ‘validity proviso’
and the latter constraint the ‘legality proviso’ (Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes on the
Authority of Law’, 198–9).
Noel Malcolm has raised some objections to the legality proviso (Malcolm,
‘Thomas Hobbes: Liberal Illiberal’, 131). I focus on the validity proviso (which
Malcolm concedes ‘should not be diﬃcult to accept’) (Malcolm, ‘Thomas
Hobbes: Liberal Illiberal’, 130). On the validity proviso, actions are only attribu-
table to the sovereign in his political capacity if they are ‘publicly accessible
and recognizable to his subjects as an expression of will’ (Dyzenhaus,
‘Hobbes on the Authority of Law’, 198). I doubt the introduction of this
proviso succeeds as an attempt to place constitutional constraints on what
counts as an act of the commonwealth as opposed to an act of the sovereign’s
natural person. We may accept that for any act to be recognizable as an act of
the sovereign in his political capacity, it must satisfy a rule of recognition.
However, it does not follow that acts that fail to satisfy a rule of recognition
are therefore acts of the sovereign in his natural capacity. Hobbes may also
hold that the acts in question are unrecognizable as acts in either the sover-
eign’s natural or political capacity, and accordingly that the sovereign did not
act at all.
It is true that sovereigns in their political capacity are artiﬁcial persons in
the sense that in that capacity they ‘have their words and actions Owned by
those whom they represent’ (L 16.4, p. 244). Yet, it is impossible that sover-
eigns (as natural persons) act outside the bounds that constrain this artiﬁcial
person. Citizens have authorized ‘without stint’ all actions of the ‘Man, or
31Dyzenhaus, ‘How Hobbes Met the “Hobbes Challenge”’; Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes’s Constitutional Theory’;
Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes on the Authority of Law’. Also, Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise (esp. 14ﬀ.); Klim-
chuk, ‘Hobbes on Equity’.
32Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes’s Constitutional Theory’ (466); also Klimchuk, ‘Hobbes on Equity’ (176); Fox-Decent,
Sovereignty’s Promise (14–21).
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Assembly of Men’ in the original agreement (L 16.14, p. 250; L 18.3, p. 266). The
sovereign therefore never fails to act as representative of the commonwealth
(if he acts at all). This conclusion is central to Hobbes’ response to parliamen-
tarian writers opposing Charles I. It permits him to accept the premises of their
theory while rejecting the rebellious conclusions they derived from it. He
accepts, as authors such as Parker and Prynne had done, that the king pos-
sesses a natural and political capacity or oﬃce, and that he holds the latter
by a grant from the people. Yet, he denies that this implies that the king
could commit a breach of trust and thereby forfeit his public oﬃce. Since
the sovereign is the ‘Representative unlimited’ the sovereign never acts as a
merely natural person and citizens never have grounds ‘to make warre
upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their
Soveraign’ (L 22.9, p. 352; also L 24.7, p. 390).
The indivisibility of the capacities of the supreme magistrate is observable
in Hobbes’ treatment of the rule of recognition. In conformity with the validity
proviso Hobbes accepts as an existence condition of positive law that it
can be known to be an expression of the will of the sovereign (L 26.16,
p. 426). Citizens are not bound by positive law before they know (or can be
reasonably expected to know) the identity of the legislator (the sovereign
in his political capacity – since positive laws, as noted, are commands of the
commonwealth). This condition, Hobbes submits, is easily satisﬁed given
the contractualist foundations of the state: the ‘Legislator is supposed in
every Common-wealth to be evident, because he is the Soveraign, who
having been Constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed by every
one to be suﬃciently known’ (L 26.16, p. 426). Citizens are expected to have
knowledge of the identity of sovereign since they have ‘constituted’ him in
the now obsolete sense of having appointed him to an oﬃce or position of
authority.33 The person they have so ‘constituted’ is the natural person of
the sovereign (the ‘Man, or Assembly of Men’) whom they have authorized
and to whom they have alienated their right to govern and owe allegiance.34
Accordingly, knowledge of the (will of) the legislator – the sovereign in his pol-
itical capacity – is acquired by means of knowledge of the (will of) the sover-
eign’s natural person. This is in conformity with Hobbes’ rejection of the cum
duo Iura rule and implies that if we can attribute the action to the supreme
magistrate in his personal capacity we can always also attribute it to him in
his political capacity.35
33Oxford English Dictionary, ‘constitute, v.’ The entry cites L 22.1 (p. 248) as example of this antiquated use
of ‘constitute’.
34See also Hobbes’ claim that the rights of sovereignty ‘are the markes, whereby a man may discern in
what Man, or Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth’ (L 18.16, p. 278).
35This is not to deny that Hobbes accepts the possibility that some actions cannot be successfully attrib-
uted to the sovereign. He observes that if the sovereign seems to grant away some rights of sovereignty,
without explicitly renouncing sovereignty itself, ‘the Grant is voyd’, and if the sovereign appears to tol-
erate within the commonwealth a corporation with unlimited authority over its members, this is
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It may appear implausible that what the sovereign does on personal title
can always also be attributed to the commonwealth. S.A. Lloyd, for instance,
supposes that, ‘[o]f course, monarchs may have private wills about matters not
concerning the public. “Honey, make me a sandwich” is not a command
issued as the representative of the person of the commonwealth’ (Lloyd,
‘Authorization and Moral Responsibility’, 172, fn. 9). Yet, one will be hard-
pressed to ﬁnd instances where Hobbes admits that the sovereign can act
in a purely private capacity.36 His treatment of the sovereign’s public ministers
and personal servants is a case in point. Servants such as ushers attending to
assemblies or chamberlains employed in the household of a monarch serve
the sovereign in his ‘naturall Capacity’, while public ministers serve the sover-
eign in his ‘Politique’ capacity (L 23.2, p. 376). One might suspect that insofar
as the sovereign addresses servants he represents only himself while he acts
in name of the commonwealth when directing public ministers. However,
this is not how Hobbes conceives of the distinction. Public ministers serve
the sovereign in his ‘Politique’ capacity by virtue of being employed ‘with
Authority to represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-
wealth’ (L 23.2, p. 376). They are authorized to ‘represent the person of the
Soveraign’ meaning that their actions, as public ministers, ‘have the
Common-wealth for Author’ (L 23.7 p. 380; also L 23.6, p. 378; L 23.12,
p. 382). Personal servants of the sovereign, conversely, assist the sovereign
in his natural capacity in the sense that they do not, as servants, represent
the commonwealth. What makes their service private is that they remain
private citizens. The same holds for ambassadors who concern themselves
with the private matters of the sovereign. ‘An Ambassador sent from a
Prince, to congratulate, condole, or to assist at the solemnity, though the
Authority be Publique, yet because the businesse is Private, and belonging
to him in his natural capacity; is a Private person’ (L 23.12, p. 382). The Ambas-
sador, sent to attend to the sovereign’s private aﬀairs must be considered a
servant or private person. While this identiﬁes matters that concern the
sovereign in his private capacity only, it does not show that the public and
something ‘the Soveraign cannot be understood to doe’ (L 18.17, p. 280; L 22.5 p. 350). However, such
passages do not entail that Hobbes is committed, in these instances, to attributing an action exclusively
to the sovereign’s natural person. The conclusion must rather be that that the sovereign does not act in
either his natural or his political capacity.
36One may ﬁnd some evidence for the possibility of attributing an action solely to the sovereign in his
personal capacity in Behemoth where Hobbes observes that ‘the King though as a Father of Children,
and a Master of Domestick seruants command many things which bind those children and seruants,
yet he commands the people in generall neuer but by a precedent Law, and as a Politick not a Naturall
person’ (B p. 174). See Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes on the Authority of Law’ (192). However, as Malcolm notes
referring to L 21.7 (p. 330), in Leviathan ‘Hobbes clearly allows that a sovereign, acting in his, her, or its
sovereign capacity, can issue commands that are ad hoc or indeed ad hominem’ (Malcolm, ‘Thomas
Hobbes: Liberal Illiberal’, 130). The English Leviathan contains one passage where Hobbes maintains
that beneﬁts bestowed out of fear to appease powerful subjects are actions by the sovereign ‘considered
in his natural person, and not in the person of the Common-wealth’ (L 28.25, p. 496). In the Latin
Leviathan he removes the clause (LL 28, p. 497).
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private capacities of the sovereign are separable: the ambassador acted on
public authority. It only shows that being authorized by the sovereign is a
necessary, not a suﬃcient condition, to be regarded a public minister.
When Hobbes maintains that servants or ambassadors attend to the sover-
eign in his private capacity, he is not admitting that the sovereign can act
in a purely private capacity. The request ‘Honey, make me a sandwich’,
uttered by the sovereign, is also made on behalf of the entire common-
wealth. It is the implication of Hobbes’ commitment to the indivisibility of
the sovereign’s natural and political capacities.
6.
Quentin Skinner has argued that the publication of Leviathan forms a ground-
breaking moment in the development of western political thought. In
Leviathan, Skinner maintains, Hobbes articulates for the ﬁrst time the theory
of state sovereignty that has dominated much of our political discourse
since. He highlights passages where Hobbes assigns the exercise of govern-
ment functions to the commonwealth rather than the (natural person of the)
sovereign and speaks of the ‘Authority’ and ‘Soveraign Power of the
Common-wealth’ (L 26.22, p. 430; L 22.23, p. 366; L 28.23, p. 494; L 33.24,
p. 604; L 22.3, p. 348; L 10.52, p. 146; L 22.27, p. 368; L 29.12; p. 506; L 30.14,
p. 534). He concludes that, for Hobbes, sovereigns ‘are not the proprietors of
their sovereignty’ but representatives and temporary holders of an oﬃce
(Skinner, ‘Hobbes and the Purely Artiﬁcial Person’, 20). It is the commonwealth
that ultimately ‘must be regarded as the true possessor of sovereignty’ (Skinner,
‘A Genealogy’, 347; Skinner, ‘Hobbes and the Purely Artiﬁcial Person’, 20).
Several critics, including notably Arash Abizadeh and A.P. Martinich, have
remained unconvinced. They respond that in Leviathan Hobbes continues
to defend the view that the sovereign, not the commonwealth, holds sover-
eignty.37 In The Elements and De Cive he had, in conformity with the traditional
Aristotelian conception of property as deﬁned by the right of alienation,
emphasized that the sovereign has the right to alienate sovereignty (Aristotle,
Rhetoric 1.5.7 [1361a]). The sovereign ‘hath the dominion in his own right’ and
therefore ‘may dispose thereof at his own will’, including by appointing a suc-
cessor (EL 2.4.11, p. 135; DCv 7.16, pp. 98–9; EL 2.2.9, p. 122; DCv 7.15, p. 98;
DCv 9.12, p. 112). In Leviathan this position reappears unaltered. Hobbes
again maintains that sovereigns, not commonwealths, have ‘Soveraign
Power in propriety’, and that they therefore have the ‘right to dispose of
the Succession’ including to ‘sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger’
(L 19.18, p. 300; L 19.23, p. 304; L 18.16, p. 278; L 42.19, p. 796; L 42.114, p. 902).
Therefore, as Abizadeh concludes, the sovereign ‘owns sovereignty in the
37Abizadeh, ‘Sovereign Jurisdiction’; Martinich, ‘Authorization and Representation’.
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precise sense that he can control it, use it, lend its use or exercise to others,
and even sell or transfer it as he sees ﬁt’.38
Although not conducted in these terms, the debate between Skinner and
his critics concerns the question in what capacity the supreme magistrate
enjoys his sovereignty. Does the sovereign hold sovereignty in his political
capacity, as Skinner maintains, such that he can exercise sovereignty only
insofar as he bears the person of the commonwealth? Or does he hold sover-
eignty as a natural person and as object of private property, as Abizadeh and
others have it? I have argued that Hobbes’ treatment of how sovereign power
is held by the sovereign follows a broadly traditional structure, with clear pre-
cedents in medieval and early modern English constitutional thought. Hobbes
is unwilling to assign sovereignty to a fully impersonal state, precisely because
it would permit the ‘damnable and damned’ doctrine that one owes alle-
giance to the royal oﬃce independently of the person occupying that
oﬃce. It is of course true, as Skinner maintains, that ‘whatever actions he
[the sovereign] performs in his oﬃcial capacity are always attributed to the
state and count as actions of the state’ (Skinner, ‘A Genealogy’, 347).
However, the exercise of sovereignty may be attributed to the impersonal
commonwealth only by virtue of the existence of a natural person which is
inseparably tied to it. Hobbes remains committed to the traditional
common law notion of a sovereign who in his natural capacity commands
allegiance from the citizens. Hence, while the person of the state may be
regarded as the ‘true possessor of sovereignty’, so may the natural person
of the sovereign. There is a communication of qualities between the multiple
capacities of the highest magistrate that makes it possible for Hobbes to
maintain both with equal vigour. It probably also makes his position less revo-
lutionary than Skinner has thought.
This does, however, not fully vindicate the opposing view that the supreme
magistrate holds sovereignty as natural person and as object of private prop-
erty. While it is true that the rights of sovereignty are held by the sovereign on
personal title, Hobbes’ rejection of the cum duo Iura rule allows him to assign
the same rights to the sovereign in the exercise of his public oﬃce. In
Leviathan Hobbes appropriates an account of authorization advanced by par-
liamentarian authors aiming to conceive of the supreme magistrate as a del-
egate of the people.39 Yet, rather than admitting to their radical conclusions,
he shows their theory to be consistent with his initial theory, defended in The
Elements and De Cive, of sovereignty as the object of full ownership of the
highest magistrate. Nevertheless, the implication is that all exercises of sover-
eign power are equally attributable to the commonwealth, even the act of
appointing a successor or transferring sovereignty to a foreign ruler; if the
38Abizadeh, ‘Sovereign Jurisdiction’ (410); see also Martinich, ‘Authorization and Representation’ (332).
39Skinner, ‘Hobbes on Representation’; Brito Viera, The Elements of Representation (150).
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sovereign exercises his ‘right to dispose of the Succession’ he does so (also) in
name of the commonwealth. The sovereign, therefore, cannot assert owner-
ship of sovereign power against the commonwealth. It is impossible, in
other words, for the sovereign in his personal capacity to assert ownership
against himself in his political capacity. The reason is simply that the rights
he holds in both capacities are equivalent.
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